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UTILITARIANISM LEFT AND RIGHT: A
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR ARMOUR
ROBERT

F. NAGEL

Professor Armour's paper is a criticism of the conservative
argument, said to be advanced by Shelby Steele and others, that
affirmative action today is counterproductive in view of the
virtual elimination of racial barriers to black social and economic
development. According to Professor Armour, these conservatives
think that "it only makes sense to talk of an American racist past
...... They see contemporary America "as practically colorblind."2 Professor Armour criticizes this argument on the ground
that it is false as an empirical matter.' While he acknowledges
that discrimination based on conscious racial prejudice has
diminished in recent years, Armour observes that discrimination,
especially discrimination based on reflexive or unconscious
stereotyping, still persists.4 Because blacks continue to face this
form of racial discrimination, he concludes it is wrong to think
that affirmative action is no longer needed or that it undermines
progress which would otherwise be made.
This critique separates two issues that are often combined:
one issue is whether affirmative action is justified, and the other
is whether whites are morally culpable. To the extent that
Professor Armour bases his defense of affirmative action on the
need to correct the consequences of unconscious stereotypes
rather than intentional acts or beliefs, his argument does not
depend on any claims about moral responsibility, at least in the
traditional sense. Even if one were to conceive of unconsciously
racist whites as innocent victims of their own socialization, it
would nevertheless be possible to conclude that affirmative action
is justified to counteract the discriminatory behavior that whites
cannot help but which remains a fact of life.
This separation of the question of social utility from the
question of guilt is, I think, consistent with a broader philosophi* Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado.
1. Jody Davis Armour, Hype and Reality in Affirmative Action, 68 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1173, 1173 (1997).
2. Id. at 1174.
3. See id. at 1174-84.
4. See id.
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cal position that Professor Armour holds. He is highly skeptical
about moral judgments in general. It is for this reason that he
criticizes mainstream commentators who object to social deprivation defenses in the criminal law. Professor Armour says these
commentators fail to see "that our current approaches to just
deserts turn not on objective moral truth, but rather on political,
ideological, and social psychological grounds .... "'
Professor Armour also notes a parallel between these
mainstream commentators and critics of affirmative action; they
both, he says, argue that deviations from a "just deserts approach" are demeaning.' In much the same way that criminal
law traditionalists argue that social determinism robs defendants
of personal responsibility, critics of affirmative action argue that
racial preferences rob blacks of a sense of achievement. Professor
Armour counters that in both cases the just deserts model does
not reflect objective moral judgments but certain psychological
needs-for example, the need whites may have to preserve their
own sense of achievement or virtue.7 Many opponents of affirmative action, then, may be clinging to the ideal of merit to protect
themselves from acknowledging the ways in which their own
achievements are based on favoritism of various kinds.
I suspect that it is because of Professor Armour's profound
skepticism about the objectivity of moral judgments that he wants
to replace moralizing with empiricism in the affirmative action
debate. He urges a pragmatic approach that asks: To what
extent does discrimination actually exist? And does affirmative
action help to overcome it?
Now I admire a great deal about Armour's no-nonsense
approach. However, I do not believe that he has offered a
refutation of the conservative argument against affirmative
action, at least as that argument is made by Shelby Steele. In
fact, to a surprising extent Professor Armour's analysis overlaps
with Shelby Steele's. Attention to this area of overlap helps to
identify more precisely where their disagreement lies and why
Armour's position in this disagreement cannot be said to prevail
over Steele's. Moreover, the nature of this disagreement has, as
I will suggest, certain important institutional implications.

5. Id. at 1194.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 1194-95.
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Professor Armour says that Steele's opposition to affirmative

action is based on the untested assumption that racial barriers
have been virtually eliminated. And Steele does assert that,
especially for middle-class blacks, race is less of a factor in
determining lifetime opportunities than it once was.' But he also
repeatedly acknowledges that racism still exists and is still a
barrier.9 Moreover, when Steele writes about the continuing
existence of racial discrimination; it is quite clear that he means
to include the kind of unconscious stereotyping that Professor
Armour says is now the dominant cause of discriminatory
treatment. Here, for instance, is one passage from Steele's book:
Black skin has more dehumanizing stereotypes associated
with it than any other skin color in America, if not the world.
When a black presents himself in an integrated situation, he
knows that his skin alone may bring those stereotypes to life
... and that he, as an individual, may be diminished by his
race before he has a chance to reveal a single aspect of his
personality. 10
If Steele's opposition to affirmative action is not based on the
belief that racial discrimination, either conscious or unconscious,
no longer exists, then on what is it based? Steele's opposition is
based on the claim, which he makes repeatedly, that other
barriers now account for a greater part of the disadvantage
suffered by blacks than does racial discrimination.1 1 Now, it
might be thought that in making this empirical claim, Steele
must be smuggling back in the assumption that America is now
essentially color-blind, but I do not think so. After all, it is
possible to believe both that blacks face significant racial
discrimination and that they also face other obstacles that are
even more significant.
So, if Shelby Steele agrees with Professor Armour that
significant amounts of racial discrimination exist today, why does
he not also agree with Armour's conclusion that affirmative action
is needed? Most of Steele's book is a series of speculations about

8. See SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF
RACE INAMERICA 23 (1991).
9. See id. at 23, 49, 169.
10. Id. at 43; see also id. at 59, 112.
11. See id. at 54, 69, 165. In places, Armour acknowledges this point. See
Armour, supra note 1, at 1173, 1176 n.l1.

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

1204

[Vol. 68

the psychological needs and costs involved when blacks condemn
whites for their racial discrimination and when whites seek to
expiate this condemnation. He sees this relationship as a
treacherously ungrounded and self-serving moral competition.
The driving need to establish racial innocence, he argues, causes
both sides to misperceive problems and to ignore potentially
effective solutions. Guilt, Steele says, "is ...very dangerous...
because of its tendency to draw us into self-preoccupation and
escapism."' 2 Steele sees this preoccupation and escapism as the
greatest barrier to black progress today. It is because affirmative
action is built on-and encourages-the dangerous and unhelpful
idea of guilt that Steele opposes it.
While Professor Armour surely disagrees with Steele's
assertions about what is the primary obstacle for blacks in today's
society, notice that the both Steele and Armour share a deep
skepticism about the objectivity and usefulness of judgments of
moral culpability. Armour relies on unconscious stereotyping to
defend affirmative action because he is skeptical about the
concept of personal guilt, while Steele attacks affirmative action
for the same reason. They even use some of the same illustrations. Both, for example, note that the moral stance taken by
whites can be an effort to protect themselves from the knowledge
that their own success is often based on non-merit factors such as
preferences for the children of alumni in college admissions.'"
More generally, like Armour, Steele observes, "Selfish white guilt
is really self-importance."' 4 Steele's skepticism about moralism
leads him to the conclusion that past culpability is simply
irrelevant to the harshly utilitarian problem of identifying the
strategies that will most improve the conditions of black Americans. He candidly states, "[B]lack Americans will never be saved
or even assisted terribly much by others, never be repaid for
[their] suffering, and never find... symmetrical, historical justice
"15

For Professor Armour, distrust of judgments of moral
culpability results in a defense of affirmative action as a method
of overcoming barriers to advancement, whether or not those
barriers are the result of culpable behavior. This same distrust

12.
13.
14.

STEELE, supra note 8,at 85.
See id. at 112; Armour, supra note 1, at 1197-99.
STEELE, supra note 8,at 91.

15. Id. at 172.
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impels Shelby Steele to propose "a new spirit of pragmatism in
racial matters."' 6 By this he means both whites and blacks
should, as he puts it, slacken their "grip on innocence.'
Giving
up on the powerful pull of moralism, they should simply expand
the policies that "have worked" to overcome discrimination and
abandon those that have not worked.' 8 In different degrees and
with different emphases, both Steele and Armour say: Put moral
culpability aside and discover what as a matter of fact is holding
up black progress and what as a matter of fact will overcome the
barriers to that progress.
So it seems to me that the real dispute between Professor
Armour and Shelby Steele is much narrower than it might at first
appear. The dispute is not over whether racial discrimination
still exists in either conscious or unconscious forms. It is not over
whether the unjustness or immorality of racial discrimination
justifies affirmative action. And it is not over whether pragmatic
empiricism should replace moralism as the basis for resolving
racial issues. The real dispute is over the cold factual question of
whether affirmative action reduces barriers to black advancement, as Professor Armour believes, or increases those barriers,
as Shelby Steele believes.
On this question, it seems to me that Steele and Armour are
like ships passing in the night. In arguing that affirmative action
is dysfunctional, Steele relies mainly on introspective description,
informal social observation, psychological speculation, and
assertion. All this may be insightful and interesting, but it is
hardly decisive. On the other hand, Professor Armour's data on
the existence of discrimination demonstrate only that there is
discrimination, not that Steele is wrong to think that correcting
it by affirmative action will reinforce white racism or immobilize
and demoralize blacks.
Moreover, even assuming that Professor Armour is right in
believing that modern discrimination is mainly caused by
unconscious stereotyping, it does not necessarily follow that
affirmative action is functional. It is at least logically possible
that these unconscious stereotypes are reinforced by the behavior
and attitudes engendered by affirmative action. In fact, the
evidence that discrimination continues to occur many years after
16. Id. at 91.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 172.
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affirmative action programs were first introduced provides at
least some indication that these programs might be producing
unconscious racism.
Neither author provides hard information relevant to the
issue of utility. Steele alludes to disproportionate dropout rates
for blacks in higher education. Armour simply asserts that
affirmative action programs "help women, blacks, and Hispanics
gain access to certain job markets and educational institutions
.... ,19 On the question of whether this access has created any
longer-run costs for minority success, Armour substitutes
normativity for empiricism; he says blandly, "Self-doubt and selfassurance should stem not from how one gains access to opportunities, but what he or she does with them."2 He then adds some
anecdotes of the very kind that Steele utilizes. In short, both
authors see the basic issue as empirical, but neither provides any
systematic empirical information.
To make matters more uncertain, even if Steele should turn
out to be right about the counterproductive effects of affirmative
action, it might be that those effects would be reduced or eliminated if affirmative action were reconceptualized without the
baggage of moral culpability. That is, Armour's brand of affirmative action might not produce the problems that Steele asserts are
produced by programs that are built on white guilt and black
victimization. Neither Armour nor Steele offers any direct
evidence on this question, of course, since present programs are
not designed or rationalized as responses to unconscious discrimination.
It is very academic of me to criticize the lack of relevant
empirical evidence, but my point is not the usual call for further
investigation. A moment's reflection suggests that even if the
consequences of affirmative action were studied carefully in all
the possible settings-including, for example, public secondary
education and private business-we would still not have any
certainty. For one thing, the most plausible hypothesis is that
there is some truth to what both Steele and Armour believe. It
stands to reason that by providing daily examples of minority
group members with successful careers, affirmative action does
in some important ways overcome and break down unconscious

19. Armour, supra note 1, at 1196.
20. Id.
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stereotypes. But it also stands to reason that by increasing
resentments and by focusing extra attention on minority failures,
affirmative action might sometimes reinforce those stereotypes.
Thus the relevant empirical question is an exceedingly difficult
one: which of the two competing and simultaneous sets of
consequences are more important? It is not likely that social
science can tell us the answer to this question. Even if the
immediate effects of affirmative action programs could be sorted
out and compared, it would not be at all certain which set of
consequences would predominate in the long run. And even if
affirmative action were somehow shown to be more constructive
than dysfunctional in the long run, it would remain uncertain
whether blacks could have achieved even more progress, as Steele
predicts, by investing in other strategies.
So, while in their own ways, both Professor Armour and
Shelby Steele provide an extremely useful service by trying to
move the discussion from moralism to empiricism, the problem is
that we are never going to have a complete or entirely reliable
evaluation of the relative effectiveness of affirmative action. We
must decide and act without the information we need.
This brings me to the institutional recommendation that I
mentioned earlier. It seems to me that when society must act in
some significant degree of ignorance, when it must gamble for or
against a policy as significant as affirmative action, it makes
sense to minimize the risks. It makes sense, that is, to proceed
in many, small experimental ways. It makes sense to proceed in
ways that we can easily abandon or reverse. Institutionally, this
means affirmative action policies should be decided as far as
possible at the local level. And, because courts do not easily
reverse direction, it means such policies should not be decided by
the courts. It makes no difference to this analysis whether a
liberal judge is striking down the California Civil Rights Initiative or a conservative judge is striking down the Texas Law
School's admissions program. In either case, judges are writing
on constitutional stone when they quite literally do not know
what they are doing.
Professor Armour and Shelby Steele agree about the need for
hard-headed pragmatism. They disagree about the consequences
of affirmative action, and even in this they have in common a
tendency to overstate (in opposite directions) what is known. If
we were to admit how much we need to know and how little we
are likely to know, we would-or should-agree on one thing:
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that the irrepressible American instinct for a national judicial
solution is exactly the wrong instinct for the momentous issue of
affirmative action.

